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Born to Be Emperor
he Principle of Succession and the Roman Monarchy
HENNING BÖRM
When Constantine I  was acclaimed emperor by the Roman 
troops in Eburacum (York) ater the death of his father Constantius Chlorus 
in the summer of 306, this step was at once both extraordinary and predict-
able—and it was probably seen as such by contemporaries, whether or not they 
considered the Imperium Romanum a hereditary monarchy. Neither in the eyes 
of the new senior augustus Galerius nor in the view of most modern historians 
did Constantine’s accession satisfy the prevailing criteria of the time. Whether 
he can be called a “usurper,” however, is of secondary importance,1 for it is clear 
that he saw himself confronted by a deicit of legitimacy.2 His success tipped the 
balance in favor of the idea that being related to an emperor justiied one’s claim 
to rule, and it was in this period that the dynastic principle was established as 
an explicit element of the legitimation of Roman rulers once and for all. With 
the exception of Jovian, who ruled for only a few months, all universally recog-
nized emperors between 324 and the mid-ith century, without exception, were 
members of only two dynasties: irst the Constantinian and subsequently the 
Valentinian-heodosian. he aim of this chapter is to illustrate the causes and 
consequences of this development.
 1 On Constantine as usurper, see Jones 1964, vol. 1, 78–79; Grünewald 1990, 13; Bleckmann 
1996, 43; Kolb 2001, 59; Lenski 2006, 62; Brandt 2006, 32; Van Dam 2007, 83; Humphries 2008, 84. 
Contra:  Odahl 2004, 78–79; Barnes 2009, 381; Wienand 2012, 119–142. On an extremely pragmatic 
deinition of “usurpers” as “emperors who had been defeated in civil war” and the term tyrannus as 
a designation for “a failed augustus,” see Humphries 2008, 86–87; cf. also Szidat 2010, 27–31. For the 
purposes of this discussion, the term “usurper” denotes someone who illegitimately attempts to estab-
lish himself as emperor, and “monarchy” denotes a political system dominated by an individual.
 2 It is impossible to determine whether Constantine or his dying father gave the impetus for his 
acclamation as emperor (cf. Odahl 2004, 78; Barnes 2009, 381). he argument that the Tetrarchs, par-
ticularly Galerius, had sent Constantine to Britain so that he could be elevated to caesar by the then 
senior augustus Constantius (Schmitt 2007, 101) is speculative and, in my opinion, cannot satisfacto-
rily explain the events.
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Principate and Dynasty Before 284
he dynastic principle had been important in the Roman monarchy from the 
very beginning. he idea that property, clients, and inluence—but not potestates 
and honores—could be inherited was self-evident to the Roman nobility of the 
res publica libera. It made the careers of not a few homines novi far more diicult. 
heoretically, the principle of meritocracy obtained; but in reality, as in most aris-
tocratic societies, the Roman nobility sought to limit the number of social climb-
ers and to concentrate power in the hands of the established gentes. Without the 
widespread willingness of supporters and soldiers to transfer their loyalty to their 
patronus’s heir, Caesar’s adoptive son Octavian could never have seized power for 
himself in the Imperium Romanum.
It was probably inevitable, that Octavian—now Augustus—resolve the ques-
tion of the succession during his lifetime: a new struggle for power ater his death, 
which easily could have escalated into civil war, would otherwise have been virtu-
ally inescapable. It was natural for a nobilis to bequeath the position that he had 
achieved to a member of his family; and likewise already the irst princeps sought 
to pass on his power to a biological heir within his own family. It is not this which 
is striking and which stands in need of explanation, but rather the persistence of 
the notion that descent from emperors did not qualify a man to rule, despite all 
trends to the contrary: if a princeps died before a successor had been designated 
or, ideally, had already been made co-ruler, then the question of the next emperor 
was essentially still open.3
In the early period of the new order, this is still fairly easy to explain. hat 
Augustus as the notional restorer of the res publica could not simply bestow on an 
heir the exceptional position that his remarkable personal auctoritas justiied4 is 
obvious enough. His rule was based on the premise that he had brought the civil 
wars to an end. he honors and the exceptional powers, which clothed his power 
in legitimate forms, had only been conferred on him. He therefore had to acknowl-
edge the necessity of promoting and selecting potential successors according to 
their achievements and merits, not their familial relationship to himself. he 
principle of meritocracy, which had dominated the self-understanding of Roman 
nobiles for centuries, was still too strong. Of course, it was only proper to support 
the political career of younger relatives, but they had to attain personal auctoritas 
by their own accomplishments in the service of the res publica.5
 3 Cf. Dahlheim 1989, 16–17.
 4 Aug. Res gest. 34.
 5 Suet. Aug. 56: Numquam ilios suos populo commendavit ut non adiceret: Si merebuntur (“He 
never recommended his sons to the people without adding, ‘As long as they deserve it’ ”). he Historia 
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Yet just a few decades later, the Roman monarchy was a de facto reality to 
which there was no alternative. At the very latest, the events ater the deaths 
of Caligula and Nero, who both died without leaving a designated heir, must 
have made this clear to even the slowest observer. Both times the monarchy 
continued. And yet still the dynastic principle could not establish itself. If an 
emperor wished to secure the succession of a speciic candidate, even one of 
his own sons, he had to invest that candidate with the appropriate powers in 
his own lifetime and raise him to princeps iuventutis, or caesar, or directly to 
augustus. Titus, Commodus, and Caracalla are the best examples of this pro-
cedure. Although the familial relationship with the emperor and membership 
of the domus divina were in practice crucial for the succession, they were not 
decisive in formal terms and could not by themselves ensure a smooth transi-
tion of power. here was no automatic succession in the sense of “Le roi est 
mort, vive le roi!” A natural or adopted son of an augustus, as legal heir to the 
emperor’s property and clients, had the means to render it virtually impossible 
to pass him over without bloodshed. Nonetheless, descent did not lend him per 
se suicient legitimacy or a formal right to rule, least of all before the senate. 
Only against this background could the ideological foundation of the adoptive 
emperors be formulated, which Tacitus already puts in the mouth of Galba:
Under Tiberius, Gaius, and Claudius we Romans were the heritage, so to 
speak, of one family; the fact that we emperors are now beginning to be 
chosen will be for all a kind of liberty;. . . for to be begotten and born of 
princes (a principibus) is mere chance, and is not reckoned higher, but the 
judgment displayed in adoption is unhampered.6
Yet even the two most famous childless emperors of the second century, 
Trajan and Hadrian, hesitated for a conspicuously long time before appointing 
a co-ruler. Trajan probably never took this step,7 while Hadrian did so only 
when he was mortally ill, and even then he chose harmless candidates without 
military accomplishments. In light of the fact that an unclear succession at the 
death of an emperor would almost inevitably provoke civil war, the apparently 
irresponsible behavior of these principes requires an explanation. Presumably 
many augusti feared that their already precarious position might be threat-
ened by the elevation of a co-ruler and successor. Instead of risking the fate 
Augusta probably alludes to this passage when it reports of Pertinax that he wanted to raise his son to 
the rank of caesar only when he had earned it: cum meruerit (Hist. Aug. Pert. 6.9).
 6 Tac. Hist. 1.16 (trans. Moore 1925).
 7 Cass. Dio 69.1.3; Hist. Aug. Hadr. 4.10. In any case, Hadrian, as Trajan’s great-nephew, seems to 
have been the closest male relative of the princeps.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon Jun 09 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199768998.indd   241 6/9/2014   10:14:40 PM
242 Börm
of a “lame duck,” they ignored the pleas of the senate and the threat of bloody 
conlict ater their death for as long as possible. It moreover is scarcely a coinci-
dence that Marcus Aurelius raised his ive-year-old son Commodus to the rank 
of caesar:  the risk of being marginalized by one’s natural son seems to have 
been very small compared to that taken in the last resort by adopting a suc-
cessor. he obligation of pietas toward one’s own biological father most likely 
was considered simply non-negotiable. What is clear is that in the eyes of most 
emperors, the dynastic principle was to be preferred: that almost every augus-
tus who had a natural son sought to establish him as his successor is suicient 
proof of this.8 he fact that the relationship between an emperor’s sons could 
prove problematic is exempliied by Domitian and Titus and, above all, by Geta 
and Caracalla.9 As fate would have it, though, only two emperors—Vespasian 
and Septimius Severus—were survived by more than one biological son in the 
irst 250 years of the Principate.
If, then, the principes favored the dynastic principle from the beginning 
while the monarchy in Rome became ever more “natural,” why was dynastic 
succession to the throne never universally accepted? In part, at least, this can 
perhaps be explained in terms of the “system of acceptance.”10 If we agree with 
Egon Flaig, there was no single, indisputable source of legitimacy,11 and none 
of the groups on which the rule of the augustus depended—neither the soldiers 
nor the nobiles or the plebs urbana—was willing to forgo the advantages they 
derived from the fundamentally negotiable nature of the imperial succession. 
his had come to light as early as 41, when the Praetorian Guard on its own 
initiative acclaimed Claudius emperor, so that the new ruler would be indebted 
to them.12
Above all, the demand of the soldiers for the right to acclaim an emperor of 
their own choosing grew louder over the decades, although the military milieu 
had always been inclined toward the foundation of dynasties:  exercitus facit 
imperatorem.13 An automatic succession of emperors was not in the interest 
 8 Claudius evidently is an exception, since he seems to have preferred his adopted stepson Nero 
over Britannicus. he sources explain this with reference to the inluence of Agrippina (Tac. Ann. 
12.41; Cass. Dio 61.32.1–2). here is no reliable evidence for the view that in the end, he instead sought 
to establish Britannicus as his successor and was murdered because of it (Tac. Ann. 12.65–66; cf. 
Aveline 2004). It is, however, possible, that Nero was intended to act merely as temporary ruler on 
behalf of Britannicus. I am not aware of any other example in Roman history of an emperor’s son 
being excluded without violence from the succession.
 9 Cass. Dio 78.1.4.
 10 Flaig 1992, 174–207.
 11 Flaig 1992, 184.
 12 Joseph. Ant. Iud. 19.2.1.
 13 Hier. Ep. 146.6; cf. Tac. Hist. 2.76.4: Et posse ab exercitu principem ieri sibi ipse Vitellius docu-
mento (“Vitellius himself proves that it is possible to be made princeps by the army”).
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of the groups concerned, whose inluence remained undiminished well into 
the third century, as was clearly illustrated in the “year of the six emperors” 
of 238.14 If the closest male relative of the princeps could not assert his claim 
to the succession almost automatically, then the death of the emperor became 
an opportunity to renegotiate privileges and loyalties. At the same time, an 
emperor who had not yet designated a successor retained sole power and need 
not fear his own marginalization.
he persistence of the notion that descent from emperors did not qualify 
a man to rule is still attested by Herodian, who puts a plea in favor of meri-
tocracy in the mouth of Macrinus.15 Nonetheless, the fact that dynastic bonds 
on the whole became ever more important for the question of succession 
can scarcely be contested.16 An important step in this direction was taken by 
Septimius Severus, who expected to derive an advantage in the civil war of 193 
from claiming (ictitious) descent from the Antonines.17 He established a close 
relationship precisely between his own domus and the soldiers, which proved 
suicient to bring Elagabalus to power in 218: the young man simply spread the 
claim that he was an illegitimate son of Septimius’s son Caracalla.18 Gordian 
III, likewise a youth, owed the purple in 238 to being grandson and nephew, 
respectively, of two emperors who had ruled for only several weeks.19
Diocletian and the First Tetrarchy
At the latest since 268, the real choice of a successor lay with the armies, not 
least because the military threats to the empire meant that emperors were usu-
ally acclaimed not in Rome but rather by the armies on the frontiers. his must 
have further reduced the importance of the Roman senate and plebs.
he period of instability into which the Principate fell in the mid-third cen-
tury was ended by Diocletian. he Tetrarchy20 established by him represents 
 14 Börm 2008a, 76–77.
 15 Herod. 5.1.5–7. Macrinus in fact sought to associate himself with the Severan dynasty; cf. 
Zimmermann 1999, 220. Moreover, he allowed his young son Diadumenianus to be raised irst as 
princeps iuventutis and caesar, and then as augustus; Cass. Dio 78.17.1; cf. Syme 1972.
 16 Hekster 2002 argues, from the example of Commodus, that the character of the principate as 
an “acceptance system” did not mean that the dynastic principle was unimportant.
 17 Cf. Birley 1988, 17. Moreover, the conduct of Clodius Albinus—who allowed himself to be 
encouraged by Severus with the rank of caesar and the expectation of succeeding him, although his 
rival had two sons—can be better explained if the governor of Britain did not envisage a dynastic 
succession.
 18 Cass. Dio 79.32.1–3.
 19 It is possible that Gordianus III also sought to establish a ictive relationship to the Severan 
dynasty; cf. Börm 2008a, 78.
 20 Seston 1946; Barnes 1982; Kolb 1987; Rees 2004.
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an important caesura, during which the reigning augustus separated the “holy 
family” of the four emperors from their natural relatives; they intermarried 
among themselves21 and apparently envisaged no role for Maxentius and 
Constantine. Considerations of military eiciency obviously played a role here. 
No augustus had succeeded in establishing a dynasty since 235, while not a few 
had elevated either immature or incompetent sons as co-emperors, who sooner 
or later failed and thereby weakened the empire further. Even ancient authors 
justiied the gradual introduction of a college of emperors by referring to mili-
tary threats.22 With the foundation of the Sasanian empire in 224, which per-
manently threatened Rome with the prospect of war on more than one front, 
the military threat had become far graver and could scarcely be managed by a 
single ruler.23
Above all, however, Diocletian’s arrangement reduced the likelihood of 
usurpation, which had so seriously shaken the Imperium Romanum in pre-
vious decades. Now a pretender would have to deal with an entire college of 
emperors.24 Still more important, ambitious commanders who considered 
themselves capax imperii could hope to be admitted to the imperial college 
peacefully instead of having to wage civil war against the ruling family.25 he 
emperors’ sons Maxentius and Constantine were certainly cultivated,26 pre-
sumably to prepare them for admission to the imperial college once they mer-
ited it; yet around 300, the right to rule was less hereditary than ever.
Diocletian himself began as a soldier emperor who had seized power in 
civil war against Carinus, the son of the emperor Carus, and he was perhaps 
 21 Eutr. 9.22.1.
 22 Aur. Vict. Caes. 39.17–24; Eutr. 9.22.1. Despite these explanations, Frank Kolb assumes that the 
Tetrarchy was not improvised as a response to military problems, but rather that it was the product of 
a carefully conceived plan; cf. Kolb 1987.
 23 Heather 2005, 58–67; cf. Wiesehöfer 2008.
 24 During the irst Tetrarchy there were certainly usurpers; cf. Epit. de Caes. 39.3 (hoc tempore 
Charausio in Galliis, Achilleus apud Aegyptum, Iulianus in Italia imperatores efecti diverso exitu 
periere).
 25 In my opinion, it was therefore not a matter of taking into the Tetrarchy men from whom there 
was no potential threat of usurpation (contra Seston 1954, 1039). On attempted usurpation by success-
ful military commanders in the third century, see Hartmann 1982.
 26 At least in the case of Constantine, this is certain; cf. Mitchell 2007, 62. When the later tradi-
tion, which is favorable to Constantine, complains that Galerius subjected the young man to con-
siderable danger in the war against the Sarmatians (Anon. Val. Origo Const. 2–3), there may be a 
concealed suggestion that the intention was actually not to endanger Constantine but rather to ofer 
him the opportunity to earn military laurels. Had the intention been, on the other hand, to eliminate 
him, there would have been more simple means. Eusebius also mentions the support for Constantine 
through his father’s colleagues (Euseb. Vit. Const. 1.19.1). According to Lactantius, however, he had 
risen only to the rank of tribunus primi ordinis (Lact. Mort. pers. 18.10). It is uncertain whether 
Constantine was engaged to the daughter of Maximianus before 306; cf. Bleckmann 1996, 41.
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not altogether innocent of the death of Carinus’s brother Numerianus in 284.27 
Like many emperors before him, the new augustus began his rule with usurpa-
tion against a dynastically legitimate emperor. Quite early in his reign it became 
apparent that familial relationships (consanguinitas) would no longer be decisive, 
even before the expansion of the diarchy to the Tetrarchy in 293. his is relected 
in the panegyric transmitted under the name of Mamertinus, which was deliv-
ered in Treveris (Trier) in 289, in honor of Diocletian’s colleague Maximianus. 
Reference precisely to the dynastic principle makes it clear, on the other hand, that 
criticism of it already required a justiication: “Both of you are now most bounti-
ful, both most brave, and because of this very similarity in your characters the 
harmony between you is ever increasing, and you are brothers in virtue, which is 
a surer tie than any tie of blood.”28
Naturally, there was rivalry within the Tetrarchy. Lactantius may have exagger-
ated the ambition of the caesar Galerius who is said to have become increasingly 
dissatisied with his subordination to the augusti, especially ater his spectacu-
lar victory over the Persian Šhn šh Narses in 298.29 Yet it was natural that a 
system in which outstanding virtutes and gesta justiied rule could not remain 
free from tension and rivalry. he superiority of the augusti, creatores deorum,30 
however, was secure, and the auctoritas of the senior augustus Diocletian seems to 
have never been challenged by the other three emperors.31 Decades later, Aurelius 
Victor emphasized these clearly deined relationships: “Finally, they used to look 
up to Valerius as a father or like a mighty god. he nature and importance of this 
attitude have been made conspicuous by the crimes committed by relatives from 
the founding of the city to our own times.”32
Diocletian’s intention to minimize the importance of consanguinitas in 
the imperial succession is oten seen as the decisive mistake that led to the 
collapse of the Tetrarchy ater 306.33 Meritocracy and the dynastic principle 
were not, however, fundamentally incongruous.34 It must have been obvious to 
 27 Eutr. 9.20.1–2.
 28 Pan. lat. 10(2).9.3 (trans. Nixon/Rodgers 1994).
 29 Lact. Mort. pers. 9.8: quo usque caesar? (“How long still only caesar?”).
 30 ILS 629: diis genitis et deorum creatoribus dd. nn. Diocletiano et [Maximiano invicti]s Augg.
 31 Bleckmann 2004, 75. Julian also depicts the subordination of the remaining three emperors, 
including his own grandfather, Constantius Chlorus, to Diocletian by describing them as dancers and 
bodyguards of the senior augustus (Iul. Caes. 315a–b). An indication of Diocletian’s exceptional aucto-
ritas is aforded by his intervention in the power struggles of 308, when he again held the consulship 
and compelled the rival emperors at Carnuntum to make at least a temporary agreement.
 32 Aur. Vict. Caes. 39.29 (trans. Bird 1994).
 33 Cf. Christ 1995, 730; Bellen 1998, 269–270; Brandt 1998, 27; Frakes 2006, 93; Demandt 2007, 74.
 34 he marriage relationships of the augusti and caesares with one another demonstrate that fam-
ily categories were not foreign to the Tetrarchs. hus, Galerius was Diocletian’s son-in-law; cf. Brandt 
1998, 62. his was especially true for the Iovii Diocletian, Galerius and Maximinus Daia. In fact, it 
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Diocletian, who had otherwise proven to possess a sharp appreciation of politi-
cal realities, how great was the devotion of the soldiers to tradition. We might 
well conclude that he had good reasons for his policy. And indeed, if his aim 
was to prevent usurpation, then his actions were only reasonable. Retreat from 
the de iure irrelevant dynastic principle was his answer to the civil wars of the 
third century. In contrast to the emperors of the second century, Diocletian, 
who was the only Roman emperor to abdicate voluntarily,35 was true to his 
word when he propagated the principle of meritocracy.
he new system could ofer ambitious men prospects and thus prevent 
usurpation, only if positions in the college of emperors became available at 
relatively short intervals. If vacancies were not created by natural means, as a 
result of the deaths of emperors, then augusti would have to abdicate to ensure 
that the system achieved its principal aim of avoiding bloody power struggles. 
Precisely this occurred in May 305,36 and it was precisely for this reason that 
Constantine and Maxentius, natural sons of emperors, could not be permit-
ted to enter the imperial college automatically, since this would have denied 
advancement to experienced men. Diocletian’s Tetrarchy did not fail because 
of an arbitrary or naïve rejection of the dynastic principle but rather because 
Constantius Chlorus died before his son could earn regular admission to the 
college of emperors on the basis of his achievements.37
Constantine: The Founding of a Dynasty
he exact sequence of events that led to the acclamation of Constantine by 
the legions in Britain in July 306 remains uncertain.38 Even if his dying father 
had indeed bestowed the purple on him, Constantine’s pretensions to the rank 
of augustus clearly violated the rules of the Tetrarchy.39 Perhaps he was not 
is quite possible that Diocletian wanted them and not the Herculii to be viewed as the actual domus 
augusta.
 35 Bleckmann 1996, 38–40.
 36 he new Tetrarchy immediately advertised the unity of the college of emperors on its 
coins:  CONCORDIA AVGG ET CAESS NN (RIC VI 203 no.  618). he abdication of the augusti 
Diocletian and Maximian had evidently been long in the making; cf. Kolb 1995, 30.
 37 It is conceivable that Galerius sent Constantine to Britain above all so that he might distinguish 
himself in the ighting there, and indeed he accompanied his father on a campaign against the Picts 
(Anon. Val. Origo Const. 4). Constantius Chlorus’s death was quite possibly unexpected.
 38 Euseb. Vit. Const. 1.21.1–1.22.2; Anon. Val. Origo Const. 4: Constantinus omnium militum con-
sensu caesar creatus (“Constantine was unanimously declared caesar by the soldiers”); cf. Potter 2004, 
340–346, who illustrates the problems of the tradition friendly to Constantine.
 39 he sources are divided as to whether Constantine aspired to the title of augustus in July 306 
(Schmitt 2007, 104). In my opinion, there is no compelling reason to doubt the near-contemporary 
report of Lactantius, favorable toward Constantine, according to which he began his reign as augus-
tus (Lact. Mort. pers. 24.9), while he was acknowledged reluctantly by Galerius only as caesar (Lact. 
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a usurper—or perhaps he had to usurp power simply to stay alive—but he 
deinitely had to acknowledge that he lacked legitimacy. Nothing illustrates 
Constantine’s consciousness of this deicit more than his eforts to compensate 
for it, even ater Galerius had grudgingly recognized him as caesar.40
Since Constantine obviously could not claim to have performed any signii-
cant service for the res publica, as he had hardly any gesta to show, and since 
by accepting his demotion to caesar he implicitly conceded that neither his 
father nor the legions in Britain had had the right to confer on him the rank of 
augustus, there remained only one strategy of legitimation: to emphasize the 
dynastic principle more openly and insistently than ever in the past three cen-
turies. his has been recognized by past scholars.41 Constantine took the irst 
step in this direction already in 307, which is relected in the panegyric deliv-
ered in Constantine’s and Maximian’s honor on the occasion of Constantine’s 
marriage to Fausta:42
And so we give you the most heartfelt thanks in the public name, eternal 
princes, because in rearing children and wishing for grandchildren you 
are providing for all future ages by extending the succession of your pos-
terity, so that the Roman state, once shaken by the disparate characters 
and fates of its rulers, may at last be made strong through the everlasting 
roots of your house, and its empire may be as immortal as the ofspring 
of its Emperors is perpetual.  .  .  . For you are propagating the State not 
with plebeian ofshoot but with imperial stock, so that that thing which 
we were congratulating you on inally coming to pass in the thousandth 
year ater the foundation of the city, that is, that the reins of our common 
safety not be handed down, subject to change, through new families, may 
last through all the ages, Emperors forever Herculian.43
his speech reads almost as a deliberate alternative to the Diocletianic model. 
It is no longer the achievements of individuals, who through their outstanding 
service can rise to power, but rather the supposed stability from limiting the 
Principate to a single family that is the central message of the panegyric. Given 
that Constantine had hardly any achievements to show, this is unsurprising. His 
military experience must have seemed all the more modest against the glory 
Mort. pers. 25.1–5). Eusebius also says unambiguously that Constantine was acclaimed in Eburacum 
as βασιλεὺς αὐτοκράτωρ and σεβαστὸς αὔγουστος (Euseb. Vit. Const. 1.22.1).
 40 Humphries 2008.
 41 Cf. Kolb 2001, 59–61; Mitchell 2007, 62–63.
 42 he exact time and place (probably Trier, but possibly Arles) of this speech are disputed; cf. 
Grünewald 1990, 26.
 43 Pan. lat. 7(6).2.2, 2.5 (trans. Nixon/Rodgers 1994).
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of Galerius’s victory over the Persians in 298. he rhetor of 307 knew of hardly 
any victories for which he could praise Constantine.44 Until his new father-in-
law elevated him to augustus, he ranked as the lowest of the four emperors, 
and he was also the newest among them; Constantine probably manipulated 
the reckoning of his tribunicia potestas in order to make it comparable to that 
of his rivals Severus and Maximinus Daia.45 his was obvious sleight of hand. 
he only advantage Constantine clearly had over the other three Tetrarchs 
was that he was the son of an augustus. Only he was divi Constanti pii augusti 
ilius,46 to whom his deiied father had bequeathed the imperium.47 Praxagoras, 
in his brief outline of Constantine’s rise (FGH 219), mentions the βασιλεία 
he inherited from Constantius as the starting point. Circumstances dictated 
Constantine’s actions, and from his perspective there was probably no alterna-
tive. His emphatic propagation of the dynastic principle, however, would have 
far-reaching consequences for the Roman empire.
hree eventful years later, the arrangement made at the conference of 
Carnuntum in 308, chaired by Diocletian, which had sought to rescue the 
Tetrarchic system, had failed.48 he open power struggle intensiied. Ater the 
death of Maximian, his son Maxentius emerged as Constantine’s principal 
opponent. Maxentius had had himself acclaimed augustus in Rome in October 
306, and he controlled Italy and Africa.49 He was recognized by none of the 
other emperors. However, he could not only rely on the support of the sen-
ate, plebs, and Praetorian Guard, but he also enjoyed another advantage that 
must have irritated Constantine: like Constantine, Maxentius was the son of 
an augustus. If Constantine took his own propaganda seriously, which had 
so vehemently promoted the dynastic principle, then he had to acknowledge 
that Maxentius had a powerful claim to rule. Still worse, whereas Constantine 
was probably born out of wedlock,50 Maxentius was the legitimate son of an 
augustus.51
 44 Pan. lat. 7(6).4.4: Tibi cunctis hostibus alacritatis tuae terrore compressis interim deest materia 
vincendi (“Because all of our enemies have been suppressed from fear of your achievements, there is at 
present nothing for you to conquer”).
 45 Brandt 1998, 110–111.
 46 CIL 17.88.
 47 Pan. lat. 7(6).5.3. he example of Aurelius Victor, who in 360 (under Constantius II) soberly 
recognized that in 306, Constantine had simply “taken power,” shows that this perspective never pre-
vailed: imperium capit (Aur. Vict. Caes. 40.4).
 48 On the occasion of this meeting and as a sign of the renewal of the Tetrarchy, the augusti and 
the caesares dedicated a temple to Sol Invictus Mithras (ILS 659).
 49 Cf. Leppin/Ziemssen 2007.
 50 Zonar. 13.1.4; cf. Schmitt 2007, 87–88.
 51 Maxentius is probably the ilius of Maximianus mentioned in the panegyric of 289 (Pan. lat. 
10[2] .14.1).
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Constantine thus needed to bolster his ideological weaponry. He needed some-
thing that could justify his pretension to superiority. As matters stood, it seemed 
opportune to play the dynastic card yet again to trump Maxentius. It is thus no 
coincidence that next to Constantine’s father, the divus Constantius, a second 
divus, Claudius II Gothicus (268–270), was now paraded to legitimate the emperor.
And so I shall begin with the divinity who is the origin of your family, 
of whom most people, perhaps, are still unaware, but whom those who 
love you know full well. For an ancestral relationship links you with the 
deiied Claudius, who was the irst to restore the discipline of the Roman 
empire when it was disordered and in ruins.  .  .  . Among all who share 
your majesty, I aver you have this distinction, Constantine, that you were 
born an Emperor.52
here is absolutely no evidence that Constantius Chlorus was really a descen-
dant of the famous victor over the Goths.53 he rhetor himself admits that 
this claim of descent would be news to most of his audience, which should be 
proof enough that it was a recent fabrication. Claudius II had triumphed spec-
tacularly over a Germanic gens, and, like his alleged descendant, came from 
Illyricum. He evidently was remembered fondly, though his reign of just two 
years cannot have let much of an impression. To choose Claudius as an impe-
rial forebear, which thereby made Constantine the descendant of two augusti 
and two divi, was ingenious. To make absolutely sure no one could miss it, 
the rhetor openly explains the purpose of this construction:  to demonstrate 
that Constantine is superior to all of his fellow emperors, because he alone is a 
born imperator.54 his strategy strongly recalls Septimius Severus who, unlike 
Constantine, chose a ictitious dynastic connection that did not lie decades in 
the past.
he appeal to Claudius Gothicus must have been emphatically propagated, 
as it seems to have become widely known. he tradition was still familiar to 
the author of the Vita Claudii in the Historia Augusta,55 and in 361, Julian, 
 52 Pan. lat. 6(7).2.1–2, 2.5 (trans. Nixon/Rodgers 1994).
 53 Cf. Syme 1974.
 54 I am of the opinion that Constantine’s adoption of Christianity, at least initially, was also an 
attempt to distance himself from his rivals. he fact that the Christians represented only a mod-
est minority (cf. Bringmann 1995)  and that a speciic personal experience may have motivated 
Constantine’s adoption of the God of the Christians (cf. Weiß 2003) is not relevant here. Moreover, as 
a monotheistic religion, Christianity may have been particularly attractive to a man who wanted to 
establish himself as sole ruler. On Constantine and Christianity, cf. Bardill 2012: 338–396.
 55 Hist. Aug. Claud. 3.1–2: In gratiam me quispiam putet Constantii caesaris loqui. . . Claudium 
principem loquor, cuius vita, probitas, et omnia quae in re publica gessit tantam posteris famam dedere 
ut senatus populusque Romanus novis eum honoribus post mortem adfecerit. (“Some may think that 
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the last augustus of the Constantinian dynasty, portrays Claudius Gothicus 
in his Caesares as an exceptional ruler, to whose descendants the gods had 
entrusted the empire. Apparently he could take for granted that he himself was 
a descendant of Claudius, since he does not say a word on the subject: “Next 
came Claudius, at whom all the gods gazed, and admiring his greatness of soul 
granted the empire to his descendants.”56
Ater Constantine’s victory over Maxentius in 312, his self-representation 
dropped every reference to the Diocletianic order.57 In the panegyric of 313, 
the dynastic principle dominates completely; the rhetor expresses his hopes 
that the maximus imperator Constantine, to whom an heir has already been 
born, might have still more children “to govern the globe.”58 he admission of 
men from outside the dynasty to the imperial college is no longer envisaged. 
Licinius, the augustus of the East, is not mentioned; the problem he poses is 
thus ignored.
Ater their irst armed struggle for sole rule,59 Licinius signiicantly followed 
the example set by Constantine: in 317, he raised his young son Licinianus to 
the rank of caesar.60 his more than anything illustrates the efectiveness of 
Constantine’s emphasis on consanguinitas. Instead of turning to an experi-
enced commander for support in light of the dangerous situation, as Diocletian 
had done in 285, Licinius embraced the idea of demonstrating stability and 
continuity by naming a successor from within his own family. During the irst 
war against Constantine, he had acted diferently and raised Valerius Valens, 
the Dacian dux limitis,61 to the rank of caesar.62 hat experiment, however, had 
failed. he elevation of a man who was not a member of his family had not 
paid of. Valens, who was too dangerous as a new contender in the struggle for 
power, was probably killed at Constantine’s behest.63
I speak in order to gain the favour of Constantius Caesar. . . when I speak of the princeps Claudius, 
whose life, integrity, and all that he did for the res publica won for him such fame among later genera-
tions, that the senate and people of Rome accorded him unique honours ater his death.”) he author 
of the Vita claims to write in the time of Constantius. I follow the communis opinio here and assume 
that, in fact, the Historia Augusta was composed in the second half of the fourth century.
 56 Iul. Caes. 313d (trans. Wright 1913).
 57 Diocletian is mentioned in relevant sources for the last time in reference to the marriage of 
Licinius and Constantia in 313 (Epit. de Caes. 39.7).
 58 Pan. lat. 12(9).26.5; cf. Ronning 2007, 372.
 59 Anon. Val. Origo Const. 14–16; Zos. Nea hist. 2.18.1; cf. Lenski 2006, 73–74. Surprisingly 
biased: Odahl 2004, 170.
 60 Aur. Vict. Caes. 41.6.
 61 PLRE 1, 931.
 62 Anon. Val. Origo Const. 17; cf. Christ 1995, 744.
 63 Zos. Nea hist. 2.20.1; Epit. de Caes. 40.9.
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As for the youth of the new caesares, Constantine outdid his rival yet 
again: Constantine II was still an infant when he was clothed in the purple 
together with Licinianus and Crispus. It was thereby made clear to all that 
direct descent from an emperor was perfectly suicient for elevation to the 
rank of caesar.64 It was all but inevitable that this principle should result in 
a new war between the two remaining imperial families, in which Licinius 
was defeated in 324.65 Constantine’s victory was at the same time the triumph 
of the dynastic principle.66 A central element in Diocletian’s efort to stabilize 
the precarious Roman monarchy was thus abandoned and replaced with an 
essentially conservative strategy, which many emperors of the third century 
had already followed.
The Legacy of Constantine: Dynastic Rivalry
It is possible that the deadly clash between Constantine and his son and caesar 
Crispus relects tensions within the domus divina, although the state of our 
sources makes it impossible to know for sure.67 Yet there was another, more 
serious and central problem that resulted from emphasis on consanguinitas as 
the main basis of imperial legitimacy: if direct descent from an emperor justi-
ied a claim to the imperium, how would one decide which descendent enjoyed 
pre-eminence over the others? Ater Crispus’s death, Constantine’s superior 
auctoritas was never challenged again openly,68 but how were his sons to pro-
ceed when he died? hey faced essentially the same dilemma that plagues every 
hereditary monarchy in which there are no unambiguous criteria for succes-
sion. In late antique Persia, for example, where all descendants of Sasan, the 
founder of the dynasty, were eligible as heirs, some Great Kings executed all 
rivals, including their own brothers, as a precaution.69 If they failed to do this, 
war over the succession oten broke out between members of the royal family.70
his danger became still more acute in the Roman empire because 
Constantine maintained another central element of the Diocletian model:  a 
 64 Cf. Christ 1995, 744; Potter 2004, 378.
 65 During this crisis, Licinius then raised his magister oiciorum Martinianus to the rank of 
augustus; he was executed one year later, together with Licinius (cf. Aur. Vict. Caes. 41.9).
 66 Cf. now Szidat 2010, 165–181; cf. also Barnes 2011 (esp. chapter vii).
 67 Odahl 2004, 204–208; Brandt 2006, 118–120; Demandt 2007, 95–96.
 68 It is an open question, however, whether the attempted usurpation of Calocaerus (PLRE 1, 
177) was as harmless as it is generally assumed, and whether the rebel was really nothing more than a 
laughable magister pecoris camelorum (Aur. Vict. Caes. 41.11).
 69 For example, according to Tabarī (1.1060), Kabad II had seventeen of his (half-) brothers mur-
dered immediately following his accession, on the grounds that they were potential rivals.
 70 Amm. Marc. 23.6.6. On succession in the Sasanian empire, see Börm 2008b, 433–435.
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college of emperors. In addition to his three sons, in 335 he raised a fourth cae-
sar to the purple, his nephew Flavius Dalmatius (Delmatius).71 As the numis-
matic evidence demonstrates,72 he envisaged a revival of the Tetrarchy, in which 
Constantine II was probably to reign as senior and Constantius II as iunior 
augustus ater Constantine’s death,73 supported by their brother and cousin as 
caesares.74 Constantine’s failure to appoint at least one further augustus during 
his lifetime, however, ruined this plan. It is diicult to discern the reasons for 
this failure, but it is at least conceivable that he may have feared being ren-
dered a “lame duck” by a co-ruler of equal rank. Perhaps his auctoritas was 
not as unassailable and his position not as strong as outward appearances sug-
gest. his at least would explain why he spent the months before to his death 
planning a Persian war: victory would have brought enormous prestige, as the 
example of Galerius had shown. If Constantine had returned from the East as 
a new, triumphant Alexander, he could have done as he wished and raised two 
augusti to make his wishes clear. Events, though, took another course.
As is wellknown, the promised securitas perpetua did not prevail ater 
Constantine’s death in 337.75 In the following months, the four caesares failed to 
agree who among them should enjoy seniority and become augustus, since they 
were all grandchildren of the divus Constantius. he Gordian knot was cut by 
the soldiers who killed Dalmatius, his brother Hannibalianus—then rex regum 
et Ponticarum gentium—and other family members of the deceased augustus. 
he army clearly refused to accept any extension of the dynastic principle: the 
soldiers would be ruled only by the sons of the late augustus, as Zosimus soberly 
concluded.76 It was not, therefore, decisive to be simply a member of the impe-
rial family. Shortly ater these events, Eusebius also formulated the view that 
by God’s will, Constantine’s βασιλεία, which he had taken over from his father, 
had now passed legitimately to his sons and their descendants. He regarded the 
Imperium Romanum as an eternal κλῆρος of a single family.77 What Tacitus 
had condemned two centuries earlier had at last become respectable.
he massacre of 337 was a portent of things to come. he events exposed 
the fatal absence of an automatic rule of succession. Constantine’s successors 
 71 Epit. de Caes. 41.19–20. he epitome confuses Dalmatius (PLRE 1, 241)  with his brother 
Hannibalianus.
 72 RIC VII 583 no. 89. On the reverse, the medallion shows an enthroned emperor (Constantine) 
with nimbus, lanked by two larger and two smaller igures, with the legend SECVRITAS PERPETVA.
 73 Cf. Chantraine 1992. he assumption that Constantine intended Constantine II to be sole 
augustus (Cara 1993) cannot be substantiated.
 74 Demandt 2007, 104.
 75 Cf. Klein 1979a; Burgess 2008.
 76 Zos. Nea hist. 2.40.3.
 77 Euseb. Vit. Const. 1.9.2.
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cultivated dynastic succession more than ever before,78 and still the succes-
sion was not automatic. he son of an augustus inherited only a claim to rule, 
not the rule itself. Even the son of an augustus became emperor only by the 
ceremony of elevation and acclamation.79 he diference between the Roman 
monarchy and a “normal” kingdom may have continued to luctuate in the 
fourth century—it was no coincidence that terms derived from rex, especially 
regnum, appear with increasing frequency in unoicial usage80—but it did not 
disappear altogether. As we shall see, this was also true for the meritocratic 
principle. As the oice of emperor was not formally hereditary, neither pri-
mogeniture nor seniority could establish precedence among members of the 
imperial house.
his structural problem was not resolved by the fact that all three surviving 
sons of Constantine now ruled the empire as augusti. Already the third century 
had demonstrated how a college of emperors without a clearly established hier-
archy was dysfunctional; one might cite Geta and Caracalla or Pupienus and 
Balbinus as examples. he Roman empire was in essence always a monarchy, 
even when more than one ruler shared its governance.81 Someone had to take 
precedence. If no agreement about rank could be achieved, as it had been under 
Diocletian, this provoked conlict. Bruno Bleckmann has shown that within 
colleges of emperors ater Diocletian it was almost always impossible to keep 
rivalries under control. With the exception of Valentinian I and heodosius I, 
no augustus was able to establish himself indisputably as supreme.82
his observation is correct, but it raises the question of causes. In my opin-
ion, the answer lies in the airmation of the dynastic principle by Constantine. 
Among potential rulers legitimated by birth, no one was prepared to accept 
the seniority of another. In the context of an imperial college, the necessity of 
which the events of the third century had proven, this discord would inevita-
bly lead to disaster. his was a fundamental diference from arrangements in 
which an emperor owed his position not to an imperial forebear but to a senior 
augustus as his auctor imperii, even if they were related.
Rivalry and distrust within imperial colleges of blood-relatives were the 
rule ater 337; to cite Polybius, one could almost speak of οἰκεῖοι φόβοι of the 
 78 Frakes 2006, 95–96; Rosen 2006, 38.
 79 Cf. Jones 1964, vol. 1, 322.
 80 Cf. Lact. Mort. pers. 7.2. In the Greek world, βασιλεὐς together with αὐτοκράτωρ and σεβαστός 
had long been customary in unoicial usage, though in oicial usage only from 629; cf. 1 Tim. 2.2. In 
the Latin context, it appears that Christian or biblical inluence above all led to the fact that rex could 
increasingly denote a ruler generally in literary, including Roman, usage; cf. Augustin. c. Faust. 22.75.
 81 Cf. Porphyr. apud Macarius Magnes 6.20.
 82 Bleckmann 2004, 76.
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emperors.83 At the end of 337, the three brothers had attempted to agree on 
their respective territories.84 Constantine II, however, claimed seniority over 
his brothers and in 340 sought to establish predominance by force against 
Constans,85 who already in 337 had minted coins advertising his own claims 
(cf. Figure 12.1).86 Ater all, he too was the son of an emperor. Just three years 
ater the death of their father, dynastic rivalry had led to civil war, which came 
to a swit end only because Constantine II soon perished. he following ten 
years were marked by tension between the two surviving brothers; this tension 
found expression (as had been the case also with Constantine and Licinius) not 
least in ostentatiously contradictory religious policies.87 hen precisely what 
Diocletian’s system was intended to prevent occurred—the usurpation of a 
general who saw no peaceful means of fulilling his ambitions as long as rule 
was conined to a single dynastic family.88 Constans died in 350 while leeing 
from the troops of Magnentius.89
 83 In fact, Hellenistic monarchies, which Polybius (5.34.1) had in mind, were confronted by simi-
lar problems: as all heirs of a ruler were dynastically legitimate, it frequently came to bloody contests 
for the throne; cf. Gehrke 2013.
 84 Barceló 2004, 55–57.
 85 Philostorg. Hist. eccl. 3.1a; Zonar. 13.5.7–8.
 86 RIC VIII 350 no. 18. In my view, everything suggests that the dominant igure in the image on 
the reverse is supposed to represent not Constantine II but Constans; cf. Kolb 2001, 243–249.
 87 Cf. Brandt 1998, 42. On the religious conlicts ater 337, see Brennecke 1984; Hahn 2004; Isele 
2010.
 88 PLRE 1, 532; Drinkwater 2000; Barceló 2004, 92–101. On imperial dynasties between 350 and 
395, cf. Errington 2006, 13–42.
 89 Aur. Vict. Caes. 41.24. On the usurpations ater 337, cf. now generally Szidat 2010.
Figure 12.1 Festaureus of Emperor Constans, RIC 8 Siscia 18.
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Remarkably, the usurpation of Magnentius did not represent a fundamen-
tal break from the dynastic principle. History might have been diferent had 
Constantius II accepted Magnentius’s terms and legitimated his position. He 
didn’t. As it became apparent that civil war was inevitable, Magnentius did what 
the emperors of the third century and Licinius in 317 had done: he appointed 
a consanguineus, his brother Decentius,90 as co-ruler, before they were both 
defeated by Constantius II and perished.91 he decisive battle at Mursa in 351 
is reckoned among the bloodiest of all antiquity. Since it was above all the 
elite troops of the empire who died, the scenario that had so weakened the 
Imperium Romanum a century earlier was repeated once more: bloody civil 
war, precipitated by the attempt of successful generals to depose the ruling 
family.92
Shortly ater the victory, which was complete with Magnentius’s sui-
cide in 353, the sheer inescapability of the essential problem became obvi-
ous: Constantius II was the sole surviving son of Constantine, but he evidently 
did not believe that he could single-handedly master all the challenges that 
faced him. he Roman empire was simultaneously threatened on the Rhine, 
Danube, and Euphrates frontiers. If Constantius II adhered to the dynastic 
principle, then only his cousins Gallus and Julian were eligible as co-rulers.93 
Like him, they were both grandsons of the divus Constantius; their father, 
however, unlike his half-brother Constantine, was born of a legitimate rela-
tionship of the augustus with heodora—and this was obviously a sensitive 
matter.94 Initially, Constantius decided in favor of Gallus, who was raised to 
the rank of caesar in March 351, before Constantius himself took to the ield 
against Magnentius.95 he circumstances that then led to Gallus’s execution in 
354 can scarcely be accounted for, above all, because the unlattering picture of 
Gallus painted by Ammianus Marcellinus may well be biased.96 It nevertheless 
can be assumed that Gallus was unwilling to accept the role of an obedient 
viceroy, envisaged for him by Constantius, who expected him to protect the 
eastern provinces from the Persian king Šabuhr II. With this turn of events, 
 90 Cf. Bleckmann 1999a.
 91 Aur. Vict. 42.9–10.
 92 On the unclear role of the senior oicer Vetranio, who perhaps on the initiative of the augusta 
Constantina only pretended to aspire to the purple, and who already in 350 renounced his position as 
emperor—a highly unusual procedure which itself requires an explanation—see Bleckmann 1994.
 93 Blockley 1972.
 94 Zonar. 12.33. his question already appears to have played a role in 337; cf. Rosen 2006, 49–50.
 95 PLRE 1, 224–225.
 96 Tränkle 1976.
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Constantius’s attempt to prevent conlict between co-rulers by appointing Gallus 
to the clearly subordinate position of caesar had failed.
he fact that Gallus’s brother Julian, despite the considerable mistrust in which 
he was held by the augustus, was himself raised to the rank of caesar soon ater 
Gallus’s death, only underscores the dilemma. Even ater his unhappy experi-
ences with Gallus, and with some hesitation, the emperor saw simply no alterna-
tive. Constantius needed to give his attention to the Persian front, but he could 
not leave the West, where usurpations threatened, without a representative of the 
imperial family. He could not have anticipated that these threats would collapse 
as quickly as that of Silvanus, who was killed in Cologne by his own men in the 
autumn of 355.97 Only weeks ater these events, Constantius elevated Julian to cae-
sar. Like Gallus before him, Julian was watched by men faithful to his cousin,98 but 
again as with Gallus, this did not prevent an escalation of conlict. It is of second-
ary importance whether Julian himself provoked his acclamation as augustus by 
the Gallic legions in 360.99 he usurper certainly wanted to avoid civil war against 
his cousin—not least because he can have had little hope of victory—but he was 
not willing to renounce the rank of augustus. An amicable settlement was impos-
sible, and only Constantius’s death in 361 forestalled armed conlict. Aurelius 
Victor must have had the two ambitious caesares in mind when he complained 
that the evil consequences of an unclear hierarchy in the imperial college were 
easy to see in the internecine conlicts that raged in his day.100
Julian’s eforts to strengthen the charismatic basis of his rule are note-
worthy.101 his was in efect an attempt to justify a hierarchy, an attempt that 
shows that the meritocratic principle had not been forgotten. Julian’s fateful 
commitment to the Persian war can also be seen within this context: as victor 
over the Great King, he would have enjoyed incomparable auctoritas. At the 
same time, the descendant of the divus Constantius clung to the principle that 
only an immediate family member would inherit the purple, as if this were 
self-evident: “It is the custom to hand down the succession to a man’s son, and 
all men desire to do so.”102
 97 Cf. PLRE 1, 163; Amm. Marc. 15.5.15–31; Aur. Vict. Caes. 42.14–16.
 98 On the control of Gallus, cf. Zos. Nea hist. 2.48.5; Athanas. Apol. Const. 3. On Julian’s desire to 
pursue an independent policy, cf. Amm. Marc. 20.8.14.
 99 Of course, Julian could have refused the acclamation; cf. Rosen 2006, 178–185. On the reception 
of the acclamation, cf. Wiemer 1995, 28–35.
 100 Aur. Vict. Caes. 39.29.
 101 Julian early emphasized the special signiicance of ἀρετή (i.e., virtus) for a ruler; Iul. ad. hem. 
255d–257s; cf. Stenger 2009, 135–165. Aurelius Victor already recognized that inherited natural quali-
ties were worthless if the principes did not display traits such as afability and education; Aur. Vict. 
Caes. 40.13.
 102 Iul. Caes. 334d (trans. Wright 1913).
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he problem of usurpation by pretenders from outside the ruling dynasty, 
such as Magnentius or Vetranio, was not new, but merely a reversion to 
pre-Tetrarchy conditions. What was new, however, was the escalation of rivalry 
and conlict within the dynasty. his was a direct consequence of the combi-
nation of the concepts of jointrule by a college of emperors and the dynastic 
principle, and this problem became particularly evident in the generation ater 
Constantine. Whether Julian had intended to share power with his distant 
relative Procopius must remain unknown, though it is unlikely.103 Procopius 
could probably claim no imperial ancestor, and as a usurper in 365 ostenta-
tiously advertised his relationship to the Constantinian dynasty.104 It is likewise 
impossible to say what solution Julian might have chosen in order to meet the 
obvious need for at least two emperors in the empire, any more than we can say 
what his short-lived successor, Jovian, would have done.
Immediately ater his accession to the throne in 364, Valentinian I named his 
brother Valens as second augustus. Valens could not claim any imperial ances-
tors and so seems to have accepted a position subordinate to Valentinian, his 
auctor imperii.105 his stable situation gave the usurpation attempted by Firmus, 
the dux Mauretaniae, no chance of success.106 he brothers, who would never 
meet again, seem to have agreed upon a relatively clear territorial division of 
responsibilities.107 Yet this could not prevent the buildup of tension immediately 
ater Valentinian’s death in 375 between his son Gratian and the latter’s uncle, 
Valens. his probably led to the catastrophe of Adrianople three years later, 
where Valens, driven to recklessness by his rivalry with Gratian, was killed.108 
Once again, contention for pre-eminence between blood-related emperors had 
seriously weakened the Imperium Romanum. Faced with military threats, 
Gratian then broke with customary practice: his half-brother Valentinian II 
was too young to be efective, and so for the irst time in many years, Gratian 
elevated an experienced commander, heodosius I, to augustus.109 heodosius 
 103 PLRE 1, 742–743; cf. Lenski 2002, 68–115.
 104 Amm. Marc. 26.7.10. Following his death in May 366, his relative Marcellus continued the 
usurpation, allowed himself to be acclaimed emperor (Amm. Marc. 26.10.3–5), and died soon thereaf-
ter (Zos. Nea hist. 4.8.3–4).
 105 Lenski 2002, 32. Valens displayed reserve in his religious policy as long as his brother was alive 
(Oros. Hist. adv. pag. 7.32.6).
 106 Zos. Nea hist. 4.16; CIL 8.5338.
 107 Bleckmann 2004, 76.
 108 Lenski 2002, 355–368; Heather 2005, 178–179; cf. Eunap. Fr. 42 (Blockley).
 109 his explanation also occurs in the sources: cf. Chron. Gall. a. 452 (ad ann. 379): Gratianus 
parvulum fratrem habens regni [!] consortem probatae aetatis virum heodosium in societatem regni 
[!] asciscit. (“Because Gratian only had a quite young little brother as co-ruler, he took a man of proven 
age, heodosius, as co-ruler.”) On child emperor rule in the Roman West, cf. McEvoy 2013.
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subsequently sought a connection with the dynasty by marrying Valentinian’s 
sister, Galla.
When Gratian was defeated by the usurper Magnus Maximus in 383,110 
heodosius decided, like Constantius II before him, not to recognize the west-
ern pretender as his co-ruler.111 he ensuing civil war ended only in 388 at a 
high cost to the empire. Signiicantly, heodosius did not attempt to elimi-
nate Valentinian II, the last legitimate emperor of the dynasty. he famous 
Missorium of heodosius shows, however, that he marginalized the notional 
senior augustus.112 he political constellation that took shape ater the death of 
the young Valentinian, who was unable to emancipate himself from his magis-
ter militum, Arbogast,113 doubtless ensured that heodosius would send neither 
of his two sons to the West. In 392, Eugenius illed the power vacuum, and 
although he energetically sought recognition from heodosius, the latter took 
the ield against his dynastically unrelated rival.114
When heodosius lay on his deathbed shortly thereater, the arrangements 
he had made for the succession showed notable consistency. His sons Arcadius 
and Honorius had already been named augusti, and by assigning half of the 
empire to each of them heodosius acted entirely within the tradition of his 
predecessors. Even ater 395, the Imperium Romanum remained formally 
united. Yet because the two emperors were still very young, they enjoyed no 
auctoritas of their own and, at least in their early years, depended on their 
respective courts. As time passed, however, an increasingly marked delineation 
of their respective competences crystallized. his was above all a consequence 
of the inability of either court to dominate the other. he dynastic principle 
now functioned, once the spheres of authority had been determined around 
410, to unite the two halves of the empire, irrespective of any rivalry, which had 
prevailed particularly during the lives of Arcadius and Stilicho.115 he imbal-
ance that repeatedly had resulted from the occasional division of the empire 
into three spheres116 yielded to the growing economic and military dominance 
of the East, which emerged ever more clearly as military catastrophes and civil 
strife struck the West from 406.
 110 Prosp. ad ann. 384.
 111 Baldus 1984b. Maximus raised his small son Flavius Victor in 384 as augustus (Epit. de Caes. 
48.6). heodosius initially had coins minted in Constantinople with the motif DN MAXIMVS PF 
AVG (RIC 9 Constantinopolis 83d).
 112 Kolb 2001, 220–225.
 113 Zos. Nea hist. 4.53; cf. Croke 1976; Börm 2010, 171–172.
 114 Leppin 2003, 205–220.
 115 Zos. Nea hist. 5.26.2; Sozom. Hist. eccl. 9.4.2–4; cf. Mitchell 2007, 89–93.
 116 Bleckmann 2004.
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he meritocratic principle never disappeared from public discourse, even 
though the dynastic principle now prevailed; and it could be reactivated. hus, 
on the one hand, at the end of the century, in 398, Claudian observes in his 
panegyric for Honorius that the emperor had received life and the empire on 
one and the same day.117 At the same time, however, he puts words into the 
mouth of heodosius I  to the efect that, in contrast to the hereditary mon-
archy of Persia, outstanding virtus was still expected of a legitimate Roman 
emperor: “Very diferent is the state of Rome’s emperor. ’Tis merit, not blood, 
must be his support.”118 At least in theory, then, the personal quality of the 
Roman emperor was appreciated alongside his descent.119 It is scarcely a coin-
cidence that Claudian presented this notion at a time when rivalry between 
Milan and Constantinople threatened to escalate:  if Honorius, the younger 
brother, was to claim precedence, the dynastic argument would have been 
inappropriate.120
Perspectives: The Fifth and Sixth Centuries
In the two centuries ater heodosius I, no emperor had more than one natu-
ral son, and many died childless. It was mere biological chance that hindered 
further destabilization of the Roman empire through inner-dynastic conlict. 
When Honorius died in 423, his nephew heodosius II—ater some hesitation—
intervened in the West.121 he western pretender Ioannes,122 was not recognized 
in Constantinople. Instead, heodosius raised the young Valentinian III to the 
rank of caesar in 424 and sent him to Italy with an army, where a year later he 
ascended the throne as augustus. Several years previously, heodosius II had 
explicitly refused to recognize the elevation of Constantius III.123 According to 
 117 Claud. IV cos. Hon. 8.160–161: vitam tibi contulit idem imperiumque dies (“he day that gave 
you birth gave you the empire”).
 118 Claud. IV cos. Hon. 219–220 (trans. Platnauer 1922).
 119 Almost contemporaneously, Synesius also expected proven military competence of the 
emperor in his De regno (20–21); cf. Hagl 1997, 63–102.
 120 It is probably no coincidence that Honorius was the last emperor to celebrate triumphs in 
Rome, in 404 over the barbarians, and evidently again in 416–417 over the usurper Attalus (Prosp. ad 
ann. 417). His brother and rival Arcadius celebrated a triumph in Constantinople in 400 over Gainas. 
Perhaps Honorius’s transfer of his seat to Ravenna should be seen within this context, namely, that the 
city should, in competition with Constantinople, become the center of the heodosian dynasty in the 
West. On the western Roman empire and the civil wars of the ith century, cf. Börm 2013.
 121 On heodosius II, under whom the gradual process of making Constantinople “Greek” 
began, cf. Millar 2006. In the sources, he is depicted as weak and dependent; cf. Prisc. Fr. 3 (Blockley); 
heophan. AM 5941.
 122 Procop. Hist. 3.3.6–7.
 123 PLRE 2, 321–325; cf. Lütkenhaus 1998.
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Olympiodorus, another civil war threatened to erupt between East and West.124 
However, Constantius III died before the conlict could escalate, and heodosius 
II does not seem to have harbored the same reservations against Constantius’s 
son, Valentinian III, who like himself was a grandson of heodosius I.
he eastern emperors interfered in the West persistently until the seventh 
century.125 he increasing weakness of the Hesperium Imperium prevented 
Valentinian III in turn from inluencing the succession of the eastern emperor 
in 450. heodosius II had let behind neither a son nor a co-ruler. he new 
augustus, Marcian (450 to 457), strove to associate himself with the dynasty 
ater his elevation by marrying Pulcheria, the daughter of Arcadius.126
We cannot know whether it would have been possible to pass over a direct 
descendant of an emperor for the succession ater 457, since no such situation 
occurred—but it is unlikely.127 Leo II, succeeded his grandfather Leo I, albeit 
for only a few months, and in turn was succeeded by his father Zeno, who was 
declared co-emperor days ater the death of his father-in-law.128 Zeno’s brother 
Flavius Longinus, magister militum and consul, however, did not get his own 
turn in 491. His attempt to seize the throne by force failed.129 Anastasius, the new 
augustus, secured his own position by marrying the widow of his predecessor.
he death of Anastasius in 518 illustrated two things: the accession of Justin 
I showed on the one hand that the three adult nephews of the emperor could be 
passed over;130 on the other, it became clear that this maneuver was problem-
atic. Flavius Hypatius in particular, the most prominent and powerful of the 
nephews, played an important role over the next iteen years, until he died as 
a usurper during the Nika Riot in 532.131
Procopius of Caesarea attests how immensely important the dynastic prin-
ciple was in the sixth century. Not only does he observe that the three nephews 
of Anastasius were marginalized by Justin in reference to the succession of 
518,132 but he also reports the decision of the Persian Great King Kabad I  to 
 124 Olymp. Fr. 33 (Blockley).
 125 Cf. Moorhead 2001.
 126 Evagr. Hist. eccl. 2.1; cf. Burgess 1993/1994. As under the Severan and Constantinian dynasties, 
imperial women also played an important part; cf. Holum 1982, 208–209. Valentinian III regarded 
Marcian initially as a usurper and recognized him as co-emperor only in 452 under pressure from 
Aëtius.
 127 Flavius Marcianus, grandson of Marcian and son of Anthemius, however, attempted unsuc-
cessfully to seize power in the East in 479.
 128 Evagr. Hist. eccl. 3.1. Mitchell 2007, 114–115.
 129 PLRE 2, 668.
 130 he Anonymus Valesianus II preserves an anecdote that attempts to legitimize this process as 
a divine decision; cf. Anon. Val. 13.
 131 Greatrex 1996.
 132 Procop. Hist. 1.11.1.
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have his son Khosrau adopted by Justin I.133 According to Procopius, however, the 
quaestor sacri palatii Proculus had vehemently objected to the plan: “By nature 
the possessions of fathers are due to their sons and while the laws among all men 
are always in conlict with each other by reason of their varying nature, in this 
matter both among the Romans and among all barbarians they are in agreement 
and harmony with each other, in that they declare sons to be masters of their 
fathers’ inheritance.”134
Since the Roman empire was also passed from father to son, so Proculus 
allegedly continued, by a fully legitimate adoption the Sasanian prince would 
also possess a claim to the succession in the Imperium Romanum. According to 
heophanes Confessor, this argument convinced the senate.135 he episode illus-
trates how Procopius and many of his contemporaries thought. In their eyes, the 
Roman monarchy could be passed down at least from father to son.
Leo I, Anastasius, and Justin I had each shown by their accession, however, that 
sons-in-law, brothers, and nephews of deceased augusti deinitely could be over-
looked in the succession, at least when they had not been elevated to caesar by 
the deceased. None of these three rulers could claim descent from an emperor. In 
Constantinople, the dynastic principle had therefore become only one of several 
legitimizing strategies. Justinian, for example, appealed above all to the concept 
of rule ἐκ θεοῦ,136 while the ceremony of the elevation of an emperor demonstrates 
that the alleged consensus universorum was as essential then as it had been before.137
Emperors died without having ensured the succession by appointing a co-ruler 
with surprising frequency—in 450, 457, 491, 518, and 565. None of these emperors 
let behind a son: just as in the case of earlier principes, one is inclined to suspect 
that these emperors preferred to risk conlicts ater their deaths than to be mar-
ginalized as “lame ducks” by a co-ruler during their lives.138 Justin I, who elevated 
Justinian as caesar exceptionally early and designated him as his successor, is 
depicted in the sources as his nephew’s puppet, probably not by coincidence. Leo 
I, on the other hand, liquidated his own caesar Patricius and the latter’s powerful 
father, Aspar, in 471.139
 133 Cf. Börm 2007, 311–317.
 134 Procop. Hist. 1.11.18 (trans. Dewing 1914).
 135 heophan. AM 6013.
 136 Meier 2003a, 115–136. Justinian, although nephew of an augustus, could only claim dynastic 
legitimation with diiculty, as this should equally have applied for the nephews of Anastasius, who 
had not been considered in 518.
 137 Cf. Trampedach 2005; Canepa 2009, 8–11.
 138 he expectation of the anonymous Dialogus de scientia politica (5.162–167), dating from 
Justinian’s reign, is conceivably to be understood against this background. he author suggests that an 
ideal emperor should either abdicate at the latest when he is 57, or designate a co-ruler as his successor.
 139 Malalas 14.40; Marc. Com. ad ann. 471; Evagr. Hist. eccl. 2.16; Iord. Rom. 338; cf. Croke 2005.
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he irst augustus ater heodosius I  who had not merely one but sev-
eral sons was Mauricius. he eldest son, heodosius, was to be emperor in 
Constantinople; the second, Tiberius, was to reside in “old Rome.” he other 
brothers were to assist the eldest two and to govern “the remaining regions.”140
We may reasonably infer from the dry report of heophylact that heodosius 
was to rule the East as senior augustus and Tiberius the West as iunior augus-
tus, supported by their younger brothers as caesares.141 We can only speculate 
whether Mauricius’s plan would have led to rivalry between his sons, as had 
occurred ater Constantine’s death. he violent death of the emperor and all of 
his sons in 602 rendered the plan obsolete. It is doubtful, though, that a college 
of brother emperors would have succeeded this time.142
Conclusion
he Constantinian (re-)turn to the dynastic principle and succession based on 
blood relations, which promised a direct descendant of an augustus a claim to 
the throne, was ultimately permanent. he fact that emperors’ sons were the 
most natural successors of their fathers was not in itself new, as a glance at 
the Principate has shown. At least formally, late antique augusti who wished 
to establish a candidate of their own choice as successor still needed to elevate 
him to co-ruler in their own lifetime. he meritocratic principle continued to 
matter. Yet at the same time, the sources demonstrate clearly that the belief that 
the natural children of an emperor were born rulers and the empire was their 
κλῆρος gained considerable prominence with Constantine.
he real innovation of Constantine, however, lay not in strengthening the 
dynastic principle. Far more signiicant was the association of the Diocletianic 
model of a college of emperors with the concept of a functioning hereditary 
monarchy.143 he model of the Tetrarchy had been efective because the auctori-
tas of the senior augustus was respected. his was not the case within a college 
of rulers in which the dynastic principle, but neither primogeniture nor senior-
ity, applied. Whether an emperor appealed primarily to dynastic legitimacy 
or to charisma depended on the situation. One solution to rivalries within a 
 140 heophyl. 8.11.9–10.
 141 Cf. Shlosser 1994, 70; Börm 2008c, 60–63.
 142 his is suggested by a glance at Constantine IV, great grandson of Heraclius, who in 681 
deposed his brothers and co-emperors Tiberius and Heraclius, and had them deformed; cf. Haldon 
1997, 68–69.
 143 Precedents may be found among the soldier emperors (Carinus and Numerianus; cf. Rees 
2004, 72); yet the constellation that several dynastically legitimate rulers had to co-operate with one 
another over the long term appears for the irst time in 337.
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college of emperors composed of blood relatives was the tendency toward more 
strictly deined territorial spheres of inluence.
Did the dynastic principle as applied by Constantine help to stabilize the 
contested Roman monarchy? Was the position of dynastically legitimate 
emperors more secure? At irst sight, at least in the eastern empire, this appears 
to have been the case: between the fourth and the sixth centuries, the number 
of usurpers in this region—except for a crisis period around 480—remained 
small. he irst pretender in the East who was able to establish himself was 
Phocas in 602.144 Insofar as an entirely diferent picture emerges in the western 
empire, however,145 we may doubt whether it was the dynastic principle that 
really had a stabilizing efect in the East. Usurpers rose repeatedly against the 
ruling dynasty over the course of the fourth century in the West; ambitious 
men evidently saw no other path to power.146 On this evidence, dynastic legiti-
macy did not protect emperors from usurpers in the least.
Various reasons produced the overall lower number of usurpations in the 
ith and sixth centuries. Among other things, it appears to have been signii-
cant that powerful men such as Stilicho, Aëtius,147 Aspar, or Ricimer could hold 
the reins without being limited by the restrictions to which emperors were sub-
ject. At least in the West ater Constantius III, the igure of the truly powerful 
man behind the emperor made it unnecessary for ambitious men to aspire to 
the purple. A dynastically legitimate but largely powerless augustus could sit 
safely on his throne while real power as patricius et magister militum, at least 
in the West, was open to every ambitious man.148 It was now for this position 
that there would be competition, as the conlict between Aëtius and Boniface 
shows.149
Constantine’s cultivation of the dynastic principle was the product of a cri-
sis because it lent him the urgently needed legitimacy. Constantine’s success 
 144 Cf. Mitchell 2007, 408–410. Basiliscus was able to expel Zeno in 475, but Zeno was able to 
reclaim the throne shortly aterward. Phocas was the irst successful usurper in the East since 324; of 
twenty-one generally acknowledged emperors between 602 and 820, on the other hand, only ive died 
a natural death; cf. Wickham 2009, 257.
 145 here were numerous usurpation attempts in the West in the fourth and ith centuries, which 
was certainly caused in part by considerable military threats. Unlike the third century, though, ater 
Constantine no pretender succeeded in achieving general legitimacy and acceptance, and the unceas-
ing civil wars eventually led to the fall of the western empire; cf. Börm 2013.
 146 he large number of usurpation attempts under Honorius already impressed contemporary 
observers; cf. MGH AA 9, 629–630.
 147 Cf. Stickler 2002.
 148 On the relationship between the ruler and powerful aristocrats, see Börm 2010.
 149 MacGeorge 2002. One is reminded of the later Merovingians, whose dynastically legitimate 
king was eventually dominated by his maior domus; cf. Einhard Vit. Carol. Magn. 113 (nonetheless a 
probably distorted depiction; cf. Moorhead 2001, 84).
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helped this way of thinking become entrenched. Over the long term, however, 
the greater importance attached to consanguinitas destabilized the monarchy, 
which would be undermined repeatedly by dynastic conlict. Emperors who 
claimed legitimacy primarily through their descent always found it diicult 
to accept the priority of a family member. his was a structural weakness. he 
importance attached to the dynastic principle by Constantine ultimately weak-
ened rather than strengthened the empire, because its transformation into a 
hereditary monarchy remained incomplete. he coninement of government 
to a single family was never entirely accepted; then, as before, there were no 
incontestable criteria for the succession, nor could there be.
To summarize: the dynastic principle had played an important role in the 
Roman empire from the time of Augustus on. For various reasons, though, 
Rome never formally became a hereditary monarchy. Between the third and 
the ith centuries, at least two emperors were always needed in the Imperium 
Romanum—at least one augustus and one caesar. As son of an emperor and 
usurper, Constantine I made a virtue of necessity and turned the dynastic prin-
ciple into an essential element of his imperial legitimation. From his death in 
337 until 450, all imperial colleges were composed of blood relatives. While it is 
true that some soldier emperors had also made their sons or brothers co-rulers, 
these men had not inherited power: instead, they owed it to an auctor imperii. 
Ater Constantine, however, most rulers could claim emperors among their 
forefathers, and so rival claimants regularly came to blows. Rome remained 
a monarchy under colleges of emperors, but there could never be absolute or 
efective equality between the emperors: there always had to be one man with 
supreme auctoritas.150 he conlicts that arose in the fourth century between 
blood-related rulers and the attempts by able men outside the imperial family 
to seize power weakened the Roman empire considerably. hrough the ith 
and sixth centuries, the dynastic principle remained dominant but was not 
successfully institutionalized; but the absence of a clearly regulated succession 
resulted in instability then, as it had before.
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